The Taliban is in power in Afghanistan for more than a year. During this time, observers could ensure that those who were skeptical about the unconditional and bright victory of the radical movement were right. Those commentators who believed that the history of decolonization had been accomplished and victory over the US and NATO forces would open up new opportunities and chances for cooperation without the intervention of non-regional powers were wrong.
Onlookers of the drama around Afghanistan can be fell into two groups. The first one is who delighted or saw an optimistic scenario for the win of the fundamentalists. They mainly were representatives of Russian, Chinese, Pakistani, Turkish and Uzbek (and it’s particularly weird) conservative and state-run expert communities. In a way, there were also small groups of Iranian specialists close to the power unit among them. The second group is experts from the liberal or liberal-conservative tradition of research. It mainly included specialists from the USA, Europe, India, Tajikistan, Israel, the Iranian stratum of reformers and some groups in influential Arab countries. This group also includes professionals from the UN who are engaged in analysing ties within terrorist networks.
Based on the experience resulting from the events of the last year, and the dynamics of global processes, we can draw some cautious and small conclusions. The first group was wrong in analysis, demonstrated a superficial understanding of the situation, and failed to predict the evolution of events. The erroneous analysis also demonstrated false views about the international system, the dynamics of the development of world politics, and the role and place of the global West.
An essential factor of the poor analysis was the political system that rules in the countries where experts worked and predicted. All the countries that were in positive feelings rather than anxiety about the total success of the Taliban and the surrender of Kabul, are autocracies. They are run by the official ideology or the beginnings and common vectors of the desired school of thought and worldview. Any attempts to deviate from the party’s general line are not welcome, and somewhere is fraught with various severe sanctions. In addition, as we can see, in Russia, autocracies have a somewhat twisted view of the world, global processes and international relations. In some cases, various conspiracy theories dominate, and excessive anti-Western ideologization does not allow us to look at the real state of affairs and potential threats. Similarly, such blinders do not allow an adequate and relevant assessment of their capabilities and potential.
Regional states played their part in overthrowing the regime of Mohammad Ashraf Ghani and the return to the rule of the Taliban. By organizing regional meetings and inviting Taliban heads to them, diplomatically supporting this movement, autocracies played the main role in raising the morale of the Taliban and defeating the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. In fact, there was a process of excessive legitimization of the movement. When the Taliban returned to Kabul, Western states and international organizations left Afghanistan, but Russia, Pakistan, Iran, China and Uzbekistan continued their diplomatic presence in Kabul and close cooperation with the radicals. Paradoxically, the embassies of Afghanistan in these countries are at the disposal of the Taliban and whose regime is still not admitted by anyone.
It seems obvious that a regime with predictable technocrats with Ashraf Ghani is better than the Taliban government, which is banned in many countries, and its leaders are included in the UN terrorist list. However, such a picture is not suitable for the autocrat’s mind. It is just an illusion of democratic institutions. Autocracies create an entirely different epistemological atmosphere, where the coordinate system is broken or, to put it another way, different from the one established in the most developed countries and those that seek to follow the same way defined by the theory of modernization. At any rate, theoretically, various institutions and practices use in open societies to achieve more satisfactory solutions. And then it does not guarantee success. Let alone closed, autocratic societies, where any deviation from the general line can lead to adverse consequences.
We are not talking about the severe response of totalitarian regimes described by the classics of political science, Arendt, Popper, Shapiro, Almond, or in the classic work of Harvard University Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy authored by Friedrich, C., Brzezinski. In modern autocracies, another view of the processes may entail gentler consequences, for example, professional ones, or lead to actual emancipation and suspension from the professional network. Therefore, unbiased analysis is complicated in such regimes. It is just not relevant and is not welcome. Experts, the “second track” and the staff discussing the regime are in fake blinders of the regime, permanently degrading without noticing it.
All year long, UN experts have been studying in detail the work of the unrecognized Taliban government and have dropped several papers that draw conclusions predicted by the second group, which I mentioned above. The report of the Deputy Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General for Afghanistan, Marcus Potzel, where it was claimed that Al-Qaeda has freedom of movement in Afghanistan, and the removal of its leader Ayman al-Zawahiri in Kabul in August this year proved the strength of ties between the Taliban and radical groups, including Al-Qaeda. Actually, the document contained theses that did not allow a positive view of the win of the Taliban from the very beginning. A year ago, the author of these lines expressed it on various Russian, Western and Eastern media pages.
Many papers have been written regarding Pakistan’s role in view of the Taliban’s victory, which is unconstructive for the region and the international system. In recent months, official Islamabad has also become more restrained in its contacts with the Taliban. This probably happened in view of the fact that the political elite realized the limitations of their influence on the Taliban and their excessive self-confidence based on such a great victory. Since the Taliban’s victory in Afghanistan, the activities of the Tehreek-e Taliban-e Pakistan group have intensified, and the losses of the Pakistani security forces have increased several times. Today, the Taliban refuse Islamabad to extradite the leaders of the Pakistani wing of the Taliban and does not cooperate in the fight against them. Since the withdrawal of American forces from Afghanistan and the return to power of the Taliban, trade and transit ties between Afghanistan and Pakistan have quite decreased.
Border attacks by militants have increased, which forced Pakistan’s Foreign Minister Bilawal Zardari to call for a review of his country’s policy regarding terrorist groups. He said that his country would not decide on its own whether to recognize the Taliban. The crisis concerning the Taliban has led to thoughts about changing the concept of “strategic depth” that began to speak on the Pakistani press pages. The Pakistani newspaper Dawn wrote that Pakistan’s policy of “strategic depth” for several decades concerning Afghanistan has become overpriced. Their ally, the leader of the Islamic Party of Afghanistan, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, also criticized the Taliban, saying that the patience of the powers is at an end and a situation in which regional powers will again begin to support the anti-Taliban forces is not excluded.
But the Taliban movement was created in the early 1990s, in the post-bipolar era, when power vacuums formed worldwide. The old system fell, and the new, unipolar moment, led by the United States, has not yet had time to get stronger. Having lost a strategic enemy, America became more relaxed and let the Afghan case take its course. Thanks to the systematic work of the Pakistani military, a radical Islamist and nationalist Taliban organization was created, mainly consisting of young people already trained in military affairs. Maintaining such a resource, the Pakistani military decided to use it to strengthen their positions, especially since the international situation was favorable, and a bloody civil war raged inside the country without clear leaders. The Taliban became the most skilled and violent participants in the Afghan conflict and managed to come to power by 1996, only two years after its formal creation. Of course, like in 2021, the radicals were given full support by the Pakistani military, who took over strategic planning and, as is already known from the literature, some vital operational tasks. With the victory of the Taliban, the Pakistani plan was actually implemented on the Afghan track, and Islamabad won. At the same time, the Pakistani military managed to convince its partners in China, Russia, Turkey and Uzbekistan of the fidelity of this strategy.
Another important player has many more global tasks and resources and is chilled to some extent to the Taliban. China’s strategic goals on the Afghan track are related to protecting its investments in mining, protecting potential logistics routes, and stopping the Islamist threat to its western borders in the Xinjiang region. Diplomatic support for the Taliban and trust in the Pakistani strategy was marked in China’s policy concerning the Afghan track. However, a year later, a certain cooling began between Beijing and the Taliban. Having a small common border and economic interests, China does not need an Islamist regime that does not want (in some cases, contributing) to stop the export of radical ideology in the region.
Regional states’ apprehension became evident during the meeting of the Moscow format of consultations on Afghanistan held in November. All the countries participating in the meeting, including Pakistan, criticized the activities of the Taliban. The discontent of the host format and other countries was manifested in the fact that the Taliban representative was not invited to this event, while the Taliban were represented at the three previous meetings of the Moscow format. At the 4th meeting of the Moscow format, the countries of the region expressed their concern on two keys: the increasing threats associated with the possible creation of military bases and the penetration of terrorist groups into Afghanistan, as well as the Taliban’s harsh policy towards women, religious and ethnic minorities and the formation of an inclusive government in Afghanistan. The region’s countries have unequivocally stated that they are disappointed with the actions of the Taliban.
Some regional powers’ policy testifies to a certain irrationality or low quality of analytical and professional competencies. So, a year after, the special representative of the President of Russia for Afghanistan, Zamir Kabulov, criticized the Taliban. He stated that the movement has not reduced drug production, does not seek to create an inclusive government and suffers from “winner’s syndrome”. Kabulov was the envoy of the Russian Embassy in Kabul in the past, where two employees were killed in a terrorist attack during the rule of the Taliban in September 2022, which has not happened in twenty years of the presence of US and NATO troops. But this diplomat was the main lobbyist of the Taliban in Russia, called the movement rational, and in 2017, in an interview with the author of these lines, he violently stood for the withdrawal of international troops from Afghan territory, which was the first sign of a changed way of Moscow’s policy.
In contrast to the ineffective and failed diplomats in almost all areas, a somewhat more rational position on the prospects of the Taliban was shared by a certain group of the powerful clan of Russia. It has always treated the Taliban and Islamabad with suspicion, given the tragic historical landmark. So, in September, the head of the Russian Security Council stated that the Taliban’s management system, the course in internal affairs and the euphoria of “victory over the United States” negatively influence the Afghanistan situation. He also, like everyone else, noted the unwillingness to create an inclusive government and called the situation in Afghanistan unstable. However, this group of elites did not affect the policy of legitimization without borders, which was carried out by Russian diplomacy on the eve of and after the triumph of the Taliban.
It makes no sense to list the empirical base over the past year, which testifies to the still radical nature of the Taliban. It is impossible to deny the danger of strengthening such a regime in the complex region, which contradicts political science and the empirical database. In addition, we will mention only some aspects.
At first, no one is fighting international terrorism in Afghanistan under the rule of the Taliban. Secondly, such a bright and unconditional victory of the radicals destroyed all plans for a compromise diplomatic solution to the long-standing Afghan conflict. Thirdly, it lost all sense to discuss with the opponent who won confidently and secured the unspoken support of influential powers. The diplomacy of Russia, China, and the steps of Tashkent and Pakistan to legitimize the Taliban turned out to be unbalanced and excessive and led to negative consequences. Diplomacy on the Afghan track has failed, and excessive lobbying by the Taliban destroyed it. Fourth, the Taliban’s victory over the United States and NATO has become a beacon, a business plan for other international terrorists. If the Taliban can do that, why can’t we. Thus, the terrorists think it is possible to fight for decades and eventually come to power. The victory of the Taliban was another major victory for the terrorists after the capture of vast territories of Iraq and Syria by ISIS.
At the same time, there is no need to deny integrating a vast stratum of society sympathetic to the Taliban and the rather moderate leaders of the movement into Afghan political life. However, integration can be different. It can have different depths, dynamics, and red lines. The integration of the Taliban into Afghan politics through mutual compromises and the crushing victory of the Taliban, which does not provide for compromise, are different things with far–reaching consequences.
The situation with the Taliban has demonstrated the useless diplomacy of regional powers, particularly Russia, China and others powers. The poor quality of analytical support for the decision-making process, ideologization and the narrow-mindedness of the foreign policy of late autocracies became obvious. All this means decline, which concerns the military, economic or technological component, and analytical and intellectual.
Instead of Conclusion
The situation around Afghanistan is deteriorating, but it is still not hopeless. After all, the author of these lines is convinced that States, not the Taliban, Make Order or Anarchy in Afghanistan. It is essential to underline that the political situation around and inside Afghanistan primarily relies on the irregular and, occasionally, inviting position of the great and regional powers. The theorist and one of the leading creators of the constructivist theory Alexander Wendt in 1992, on the pages of the academic journal International Organization, revolutionized the discipline of international relations (IR) in a way. He stressed that “Anarchy is what states make of it”, thereby actually refuting the central thesis of the realists of the neorealists about the anarchism of world politics. Consequently, events and processes in international relations are a social and political construct derived from the interests and values of great powers.
Skipping the interests of the Taliban or the population supporting it is impossible and counterproductive. Also, the Taliban in power and the Taliban as part of the government are two significant contrasts. Such radical regimes have been deeply described in science for a long time, and one day they will go on expansion. The intensification of terrorist threats has a wave-like character. The theory of the four waves of terrorism proposed by UCLA Professor David Rapaport is interesting in this context. Without discussing the correctness of the waves, let us emphasize the thesis that major political events on a global or regional scale precede each subsequent phase of activity. For example, Blues Hoffman has stressed a substantial rise of religiously motivated terrorism, especially after clerics managed to seize power in Iran.
This is the nature of such regimes. Their existence and fate depend on their expansion. If direct expansion can be avoided, which is entirely possible in the case of the Taliban, then exports will be in a different form: ideological, political, or advisory. For the next round of the active phase of terrorism, it is enough that the Taliban provide their territory to dozens of international terrorist organizations. To stop potential threats, it is necessary to strike at anarchy in international relations, fight it and try to create precise mechanisms for managing political processes around Afghanistan.
All formulas have already been described in detail and stated: inclusive government, consideration of the interests of all groups of the population, pressure on sponsors of radical ideologies and complete delegitimization of terrorism as an actor of regional policy. The Taliban must admit that they, as the current government, are not in a vacuum, and the international system is no longer anarchic. Otherwise, and in an adverse scenario, it is possible that the world may face harsh consequences associated with another wave of terrorism.
