Iran’s intentional limitation of inspections carried out by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which took place between January and February 2021, the adoption of the law entitled “Strategic Action to Cease Actions and Protect the interest of Iranian Nation”, adopted by the Iranian Parliament on 23 February, the enrichment of 55 kilos of uranium to the tune of 20% for an annual rate of 120 kilos which will allow Iran to reach its objective in eight months according to the spokesperson for the Iranian Atomic Energy Organization (OIEA), not to mention the operationalization of one hundred and sixty-four semi-industrial IR-6 centrifuges injected with gas at the Natanz nuclear site, on 13 April 2021, before experiencing a cyberattack on the electrical circuit of the Natanz enrichment plant blamed on the Israelis by the Iranians, on 11 April 2021, and the Iranian desire to now enrich up to 60%, raise the still elusive question of the stage at which the Iranian nuclear program currently finds itself.
Presented as a civilian nuclear program from the beginnings of its discovery in 2003, if we are to believe the statements of the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic of Iran relayed on the official website of the OIEA: “the Islamic Republic of Iran regards use of nuclear and chemical weapons as a cardinal and unforgivable sin”[1], recent developments in Iran’s nuclear program and statements by Iranian diplomacy spokesman Said Khatibzadeh: “ ‘all the centrifuges that (have been damaged) were of the IR-1 type’ (that is to say of ‘first generation’, NDLR), he said. ‘Let everyone know that they will undoubtedly be replaced by more advanced machines’”[2] on the 11 April 2021 cyberattack, which has fueled the debate on the exact nature of the program.
The cyberattack on the Natanz nuclear complex gives way to a clearly stated Iranian nuclear ambition, as evidenced by the Iranian desire of 14 April 2021 to now enrich up to 60%. By achieving this percentage of enrichment, Iran is 56.33% above the single maximum enrichment of 3.67% set by the Vienna Agreement of 2015 and 30% below the 90% threshold beyond which the nature of the nuclear activities of any program becomes military. The latest Israeli military intelligence sets it at “a little less than two years, taking into account not only the production of highly enriched uranium (which can be accumulated in a few months) but also the actual assembly of a warhead and a propellant”[3] Iran’s access to an atomic weapon.
OPINION | Iran’s nuclear “Taqiyah” — by @AstridViaud
For the paper ➡️ https://t.co/Vk4wiQv2Qo pic.twitter.com/8ufAuEZAs5
— Vocal Europe (@thevocaleurope) May 1, 2021
This is without counting the concern of the international community about the lack of supervision of the ballistic missile program, which could carry a nuclear charge, developed by Iran. Despite the suspension of all Iranian ballistic activity for eight years, i.e. until 2023, by the Vienna Agreement, Iran has carried out a series of ballistic missile tests combined with launches of space launchers that reinforced Washington’s fears. “Since July 2015, Iran has launched nearly 60 missiles and space launch vehicles (SLVs). […] While SLVs and ballistic missiles have different technical requirements and trajectories, they share features, raising fears whether the technology used to launch the satellite could help Iran develop intercontinental ballistic missile” [4].
The Iranian ballistic missile issue was the main reason for the US withdrawal from the 2015 Accord under President Trump’s administration. The recent developments in Iran’s nuclear program and the resulting deterioration in international security in the Strait of Hormuz indicate the failure of President Trump’s strategy to exert sufficient pressure on Iran to ensure that the ballistic program Iran is the subject of a United Nations Security Council resolution. Despite the reintegration of US economic sanctions since 2018, Iran refuses to see its ballistic program be framed as well by a revision of the Vienna Agreement as by any potential future legal text because it remains an element of regional deterrence.
Faced with this diplomatic tangle, Joe Biden said during his presidential campaign:
Iran is a destabilizing actor in the Middle East; it must never be allowed to develop a nuclear weapon. President Trump abandoned the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)—a deal that blocked Iran’s paths to nuclear weapons, as repeatedly verified by international inspectors—with no viable plan to produce a better one. His reckless actions have produced a deep crisis in transatlantic relations and pushed China and Russia closer to Iran. As a result, the United States, rather than Iran, has been isolated. Predictably, Iran has restarted its nuclear program and become more aggressive, moving the region closer to another disastrous war[5].
President Joe Biden maintains the strategic line of the United States which opposes Iran’s access to atomic weapons to prevent any cascade of regional nuclear proliferation, abandons the return of the United States subject to supervision before Iranian ballistic missiles while drawing a political posture of its own, prudent and pragmatic, aware of regional and international security issues. He opposes Iran a proposal for the gradual lifting of secondary and extraterritorial economic sanctions reintegrated since May 2018 by his predecessor against Iran which intends to take advantage of a position of strength, which it has carved out since the withdrawal of President Trump.
Considering the Agreement as the only chance allowing it to see the sanctions lifted, Iran does not withdraw from the Vienna Agreement but disengages from it step by step, thus demonstrating its goodwill to remain a party to the text of the Agreement. JCPOA, thus fueling a position of strength against a Washington decried by the international community, while at the same time Tehran frees itself from its commitments vis-à-vis the Agreement. “On 8 May 2019, Iran issued a statement including, inter alia, that ‘…in implementation of its rights set forth in Paragraph 26 and 36 of the JCPOA, the Supreme National Security Council [of] the Islamic Republic of Iran has issued an order to stop some of Iran’s measures under the JCPOA from today’”[6]. Tehran thus creates a legal benefit drawn from the legal rules of the Agreement but uses this disengagement in the service of a purpose other than that of the Agreement and which allows it to continue its race for uranium enrichment.
However, the recent cyberattack on the Natanz nuclear complex redistributes the cards of the indirect negotiations between Washington and Tehran which resumed on 2 April 2021 in Vienna in the presence of France, Germany, the United Kingdom, Russia, and China, under the arbitration of the European Union (EU) and its High Representative, to promote the return of the United States, to restore and secure the Vienna Agreement and the legal and scientific framework of the Iranian nuclear program. The EU takes over the role of neutral arbiter, which has been assigned to it since 2004, and of coordinator of the Joint Commission responsible for ensuring the proper implementation of the Agreement, which is conferred on it by Annex IV of the JCPOA.
However, the spokesman for the High Representative of the European Union, Peter Stano, rejects “any attempts to undermine or weaken diplomatic efforts on the nuclear agreement”[7] described as “constructive”[8] by all parties to the Agreement, the German Federal Minister of Foreign Affairs, Heiko Maas, observes that “‘What we are hearing currently out of Tehran is not a positive contribution, particularly the development in Natanz’. […] At the same time, he noted that the situation in Natanz will take on a ‘particular meaning’ and could give clues regarding the extent to which what is discussed in Vienna would then be implemented by Tehran’”[9].
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[1] Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (Official Website), “Iran’s Policy on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament: Statement of the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic of Iran”.
[2] France 24, « Téhéran accuse Israël d’une attaque sur un centre nucléaire iranien », 12 avril 2021.
[3] Louis IMBERT, « Israël craint une escalade de l’Iran sur le nucléaire, à l’approche de négociations », Le Monde, 11 février 2021.
[4] Beatrix IMMENKAMP, “EU-Iran: The way forward: Can the JCPOA survive the Trump presidency?”, European Parliamentary Research Service, PE 652.001, juillet 2020, p. 7.
[5] Council on Foreign Relations, “The Presidential Candidates on the Iran Nuclear Deal”, 30 juillet 2019.
[6] AIEA, « Rapport du Directeur général : Vérification et contrôle en République islamique d’Iran à la lumière de la résolution 2231 (2015) du Conseil de sécurité de l’ONU », GOV/2021/10, 24 février 2021, p. 2.
[7] The Globe Post, « EU ‘Rejects Any Attempts’ to Undermine Iran Nuclear Talks”, 12 avril 2021.
[8] Piotr Smolar, « Nucléaire iranien : mobilisation diplomatique « constructive » à Vienne », Le Monde, 7 avril 2021.
[9] The Times of Israel, “After Natanz incident, EU warns against attempts to ‘undermine’ nuclear talks”, 12 avril 2021.
